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Abstract. We report on a property-based approach to feature interaction analysis for
a client-server email system. The model is based upon Hall’s email model [12] pre-
sented at FIW’00 [3], but the implementation is at a lower level of abstraction, em-
ploying non-determinism and asynchronous communication; it is a challenge to avoid
deadlock and race conditions. Our analysis differs in two ways: interaction analysis is
fully automated, based on model-checking the entire state-space, and the results are
scalable, that is they generalise to email systems consisting of any number of email
clients.
Abstraction techniques are used to prove the general results. The key idea is to
model-check a system consisting of a constant number (m) of client processes, in
parallel with a mailer process and an “abstract” process which represents the product
of any number of other (possibly featured) client processes. We give a lower bound
for the value of m.
All of the models – for any specified set of client processes and selected features
– are generated automatically using Perl scripts.
1 Introduction
We consider modelling features and analysing feature interactions in an email system. Our
model is derived from Hall’s email model [12] presented at FIW’00 [3], but our analysis
differs in two significant ways:
 interaction analysis is fully automated, based on a model-checking approach,
 results generalise to email systems consisting of any number of email clients.
We adopt a property-based approach to interaction analysis [4], that is we develop an
explict model of the basic service and features which is checked against a set of more abstract,
temporal properties. Interactions are uncovered through the analysis of property violations.
The (parameterised) model is developed in Promela [13], a high-level, state-based, language
for modelling (asynchronously) communicating, concurrent processes. Spin is the bespoke
model-checker for Promela. Individual models and model-checking runs are generated using
Perl scripts.
Our first goal is faithful modelling of an email system as client-server with explicit con-
curreny and asynchronous communication; this is challenging for a property based approach
because of the high degree of concurrency and consequent state-space explosion. Neverthe-
less feature interaction analysis is comprehensive.
Our second goal is generalisation of interaction results. Model-checking alone is limited
to reasoning about a given number of processes. This aspect is often overlooked, and proof
for a fixed number, say m, processes, is informally assumed to scale up to imply proof for an
arbitrary number of processes, i.e. for n processes, for any n. In this paper we address the
problem explicitly and show how to generalise results without resorting to explicit induction
(which is difficult in this case). Our approach is based upon a combination of abstraction and
model-checking.
The paper is divided into two parts, in the first part we consider feature interaction analysis
for a fixed number of client processes, in the second part, we consider how to generalise these
results to an arbitrary number of clients.
In section 2, we give a brief overview of Promela and Spin. In section 3 we give an
overview of the basic email service and feature behaviour, the Promela implementation, the
properties for the basic service and features and the corresponding LTL formulae. In section
4 we define feature validation and interaction analysis, and give corresponding results for
systems of 3 or 4 client processes. We also discuss how we use Perl scripts and the model-
checker Spin for analysis. In section 5 we outline the abstraction technique and give results.
We conclude in section 6.
2 Reasoning in Spin
Promela is an imperative, C-like language with additional constructs for non determinism,
asynchronous and synchronous communication, dynamic process creation, and mobile con-
nections, i.e. communication channels can be passed along other communication channels.
Spin is the bespoke model-checker for Promela and provides several reasoning mechanisms:
assertion checking, acceptance and progress states and cycle detection, and satisfaction of
temporal properties.
In order to perform verification on a model, Spin translates each process template into a
finite automaton and then computes an asynchronous interleaving product of these automata
to obtain the global behaviour of the concurrent system. This interleaving product is referred
to as the state-space.
As well as enabling a search of the state-space to check for deadlock, assertion violations
etc., Spin allows the checking of the satisfaction of an LTL formula over all execution paths.
The mechanism for doing this is via never claims – processes which describe undesirable
behaviour, and Bu¨chi automata – automata that accept a system execution if and only if that
execution forces it to pass through one or more of its accepting states infinitely often [13, 11].
Checking satisfaction of a formula involves the depth-first search of the synchronous product
of the automaton corresponding to the concurrent system (model) and the Bu¨chi automaton
corresponding to the never-claim.
If the original LTL formula f does not hold, the depth-first search will “catch” at least one
execution sequence for which :f is true. If f has the form []p, (that is f is a safety property),
this sequence will contain an acceptance state at which :p is true. Alternatively, if f has the
form hip, (that is f is a liveness property), the sequence will contain a cycle which can be
repeated infinitely often, throughout which :p is true. In this case the never-claim is said to
contain an acceptance cycle. In either case the never claim is said to be matched.
When using Spin’s LTL converter (a feature of XSpin – Spin’s graphical interface) it is
possible to check whether a given property holds for All Executions or for No Executions. A
universal quantifier is implicit in the beginning of all LTL formulas and so, to check an LTL
property it is natural, therefore, to choose the All Executions option. However, we sometimes
wish to check that a given property (p say) holds for some state along some execution path.
This is not possible using LTL alone. However, Spin can be used to show that “p holds for No
Executions” is not true (via a never-claim violation), which is equivalent. Therefore, when
listing our properties (section 3.4), we use the shorthand 9p, meaning for some path p, i.e. for
No Executions p is not true.
2.1 Parameters and further options used in Spin verification
When performing verification with Spin, three numeric parameters must be set. These are
Physical Memory Available, Estimated State-Space Size and Maximum Search Depth. The
meaning of the first of these is clear, and the second controls the size of the state-storage
hash table. The Maximum Search Depth parameter determines the size of the search-stack,
where the states in the current search are stored. If comparisons are to be made with other
model-checkers, then the value of the Maximum Search Depth should be taken into account.
Partial order reduction (POR) [17] is based on the observation that execution sequences
can be divided into equivalence classes whose members are indistinguishable with respect to
a property that is to be checked. We apply POR in most cases.
Compression (COM) is a method by which each individual state is encoded in a more
efficient way. We apply compression in all cases.
3 Basic email service and features
The email system consists of a number of clients and one server, in this case the mailer.
Each client has a unique mail address. Clients send mail messages, addressed to other clients
(or themselves) to the mailer; the mailer delivers mail messages to clients. Communication
between client and server is asynchronous. Therefore, mail messages are not necessarily re-
ceived by clients in the (global) order in which they were sent, but local temporal ordering is
maintained, i.e. if client 1 sends messages A and B to client 2, in that order, then client 2 will
receive message A before message B. We assume (like Hall) that the system does not lose or
corrupt messages, because our motivation is feature interaction analysis, not error detection
and/or recovery.
We assume (weak) fairness, i.e. an enabled process cannot be ignored infinitely often,
when verifying liveness properties (e.g. 3 and 8, see section 3.4). In all other cases, it is not
relevant (and just increases the state-space).
The overall system is illustrated in Figure 1. High level, abstract automata for the client
and mailer processes are given in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. Note that in these figures,
transitions are labelled by conditions, e.g. in Figure 2 a transition from initial to sendmail
is only possible if the channel mbox is empty and the channel network is not full. Local
and global variables are updated at various points; variable assignments omitted from the
diagrams. We refer to states in these abstract automata as abstract states, these are not to be
confused with states in the Promela model.
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Figure 1: Email service with m clients
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Figure 2: Client process with mailbox mbox
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Figure 3: Mailer process
3.1 Basic email service in Promela
The model for m client processes consists of m instantiations of the parameterised proctype
Client, all in parallel with one instance of the proctype Mailer.
A mail message consists of a sender, receiver, message body, and key. Mail messages may
be sent from clients to the mailer, and delivered to clients from the mailer (via a mailbox be-
longing to the receiver). All communication between clients and the mailer is asynchronous.
We chose to adopt this position because it is closer to actual system behaviour, however we
have to take care that it does not result in state explosion. Delivery of mail takes precedence
over sending, i.e. a client has to take delivery of any mail which has been delivered by the
network, before sending mail. A client can otherwise send mail at any time, provided the
channel network has capacity.
The parameter associated with a client process is the identification (a byte) of that process.
A client process can either send mail, or have mail delivered, the latter taking precedence
over the former. The former can only occur if the network is not full. If neither is possible,
the client is, in effect, in busy waiting.
Communication between clients and the mailer is via asynchronous, global channels, one
for each client and one for the mailer. The sizes of the channels are set using the constants
k for the client channels and N for the mailer. During most of this investigation k = 2 and
N = 4. M is a constant denoting the number of clients in the given system and is often used
to denote a default, or unassigned, value.
The client channels are, in effect, mailboxes. The role of the mailer is therefore to deliver
mail messages to the appropriate mailboxes; clients take delivery of message by reading from
the appropriate mailbox/channel. In Figure 3, note that mbox is a free variable which must be
correctly instantiated during the specify recipient abstract state.
Mail addresses are simple integers, used to index the client processes. Initially, we im-
plemented a more sohpisticated addressing mechanism, with login names and hierarchical
domains. However, this resulted in a very large state vector and state-space (due in part to
Promela’s poor handling of structured types). Since we found no additional analysis benefit
to this approach (apart from the aesthetic one), we have implemented a simpler, more abstract
addressing mechanism.
Mail messages themselves are of no consequence, save to observe whether or not they are
encrypted. We denote encrypted text by the value 1 and plain text by the value 0. Keys are
simple mail addresses, i.e. simple bytes.
An important issue for any distributed system is that of atomicity. This is especially im-
portant from a model-checking perspective as it provides a means of controlling state-space
explosion and resolving race conditions. Promela provides a facility for grouping together
statements as atomic, provided only the initial statement has the potential to block. Our model
employs as much atomicity as possible within each consituent process. Specifically, in the
Client process, each iteration from the initial state, back to the initial state, is a single atomic
step (i.e. Figure 2 encapsulates a single atomic step) – with suitable guards which block if
the process can neither read nor write. This is crucial in order to avoid deadlock – since all
channels are of finite size. On the other hand, the Mailer process consists of two atomic
steps: one for reading a message and the other for sending the appropriate message. Any
variable about which we may intend to reason should not be updated more than once within
any atomic statement (so that each change to the variables is visible to the never-claim), other
variables may of course be updated as required.
Another implementation issue is the size of the state vector, i.e. the number and nature
of global and local variables. We must be careful not to introduce any extraneous variables
(see also 3.3) nor introduce extraneous state values. To avoid the latter, we must be careful to
reset variables when returning to so-called initial, abstract states, to ensure that we are indeed
representing the same abstract state.
The interplay between atomicity, the number and nature of variables, and faithful mod-
elling/levels of abstraction is very subtle and a challenge in this domain, particularly due
to the asynchronous communication. It took considerable time and expertise to develop a
tractable, deadlock free model. Fortunately, we were able to employ some lessons learned
from modelling POTS [6].
3.2 The Features
We consider here a set of five features.
 encrypt a message, using a (private) key, the intended recipient.
 decrypt a message, using a (private) key, the actual recipient.
 filter all messages from a given mail address.
 forward all messages to another mail address.
 autorespond to incoming messages. The automatic response is only sent in response to
the first message from a given client. Any subsequent message from that client is received,
but no automatic response is issued as a result.
The features encrypt, decrypt and autorespond reside at the client side, the remaining
reside at the server side. Note that only the features encrypt and decrypt alter the actual mail
message, forwarding does not affect the message.
We have considered all the features proposed in [12]; but for brevity, we omit them here
because they do not reveal any further “interesting” behaviour paradigms for our analysis.
That is not to say that they do not reveal further interactions, and interesting aspects of email,
but that they do not reveal any further aspects with respect to generalisation.
3.3 Features in Promela
Features are implemented within the Promela model via a number of inline functions (pro-
cedures with dynamic bindings). Most features are relatively straightforward to implement,
simply involving additional transitions or steps during one or more of the abstract states of
the client or mailer processes.
The exception is autorespond, because this feature involves both reading – a message
from a client channel, and writing – a message to the network channel. Both events are po-
tentially blocking, hence cannot take place within one atomic step. Therefore, to implement
this feature we add an additional data structure to indicate whether or not a client requires to
send an autoresponse. We enhance the initial state to include the possibility that an autore-
sponse message needs to be sent, and give priority to this over any other event. This means
that it is possible for an autoresponse to never be sent, if the network channel is continuously
full. We cannot avoid this situation1.
In order to reason about feature behaviour (see section 3.4) we introduce a number of “ob-
servation” variables. These are not integral to the behaviour of the service and/or features, but
exist solely for the purposes of analysis. For this reason, these variables are included/excluded
on a per model/property basis.
Examples of “observation” (process indexed) variables include:
 last del to
i
to the intended receiver of the mail message last delivered to Client[i]
 last del to
i
from the intended sender of the mail message last delivered to Client[i]
 last del to
i
body the body of the mail message last delivered to Client[i].
 last sent from
i
to the intended recipient of the mail message last sent from Client[i].
A further variable required both for correct function and for reasoning is the array of bit
vectors autoarray. The function
 IS 0(autoarray[i]; j) indicates whether Client[i] has already sent an autoresponse to
Client[j].
3.4 Feature Properties
We give a small number of illustrative properties for both the basic service and the features.
The properties are linear temporal logic (LTL) formulae over propositions about states. Tem-
poral operators include [] (always), <>(eventually) and X (next). Propositional connectives
are jj (disjunction), && (conjunction), ! (implication) and :(negation). The path quantifier
is (implicitly) 8, except when explicitly given as 9. Feature properties are properties that are
expected to hold when one such feature is present.
Property 1 – Basic Messages are delivered only to intented recipients.
If Client[i] receives a message from Mailer, then the (intended) recipient of that message
is Client[i]. Alternatively, Client[i] has not yet received any messages (in which case the
last del to
i
to variable will remain set to the default value M ).
LTL: [](pjjq)
p = (last del to
i
to == M ), q = (last del to
i
to == i)
Property 2 – Basic Messages can be sent between any two clients.
It is possible for Client[i] to recieve a message such that the sender of that message is
Client[j].
1In any operational email system, buffers can become full. Although this is unlikely in reality, as model-
checking involves the exploration of all feasible behaviours, this possibility must be considered.
LTL: 9 <> (p)
p = (last del to
i
from == j)
Property 3 – Basic Messages are eventually delivered correctly.
If Client[i] sends a message to Client[j], then Client[j] will eventually receive a message
from Client[i].
LTL: [](((:p)&&X(p))! X(<> q))
p = (last sent from
i
to == j), q = (last del to
j
from == i)
Property 4 – Encryption Messages are properly encrypted.
If Client[i] has encryption on, then if Client[j] receives a message whose sender is Client[i],
then the message will be encrypted.
LTL: [](p! q)
p = (last del to
j
from == i), q = (last del to
j
body == 1)
Property 5 – Decryption Messages are properly decrypted.
If Client[i] has decryption on, then all messages received by Client[i] will have been de-
crypted.
LTL: [](p)
p = (last del to
i
body == 0)
Property 6 – Filtering Messages are discarded by a filter.
If Mailer filters messages from Client[i] to Client[j] then it is not possible for Client[j] to
receive a message from Client[i].
LTL:[](:p)
p == (last del to
i
from == j)
Property 7 – Forwarding Messages are forwarded.
If Client[i] forwards messages to Client [j], then it is possible for Client[j] to receive mes-
sages not addressed to Client[j] (or to the default value M ).
LTL: 9 <> (:(pjjq))
p == last del to
j
to == M), q == (last del to
j
to == j)
Property 8 – Autorespond Single automatic response messages are sent out.
If Client[i] has autorespond on, then if Client[j] sends a message to Client[i], and Client[j]
hasn’t already received an automatic response from Client [i], then Client[j] will eventu-
ally receive a reply from Client[i]. Alternatively, Client[i] eventually stops sending messages
because network can’t be accessed.
LTL: [](p  > (<> qjj(<> ([]:r))))
p = ((last sent from
j
to == i)&&((autoarray[i; j] == 0)))
q = (last del to
j
from == i), r = (network??[i; x; y; z])
(The function network??[i; x; y; z] determines whether there is a message at any position
on the network channel in which the sender field is i.)
4 Analysis for a constant number of clients
The basic idea of feature interaction analysis is to detect when features behave as expected in
isolation, but not in the presence of each other. So, interaction analysis involves feature vali-
dation (checking a feature in isolation) and then analysis of tuples of features (checking for
violation of expected behaviour). Fortunately, we need only restrict our attention to pairwise
analysis, as empirical evidence shows that it is extremely rare to have a 3-way interaction
which is not detected as 2-way interaction [14]. In each case we consider a model consisting
of either 3 or 4 client processes and 1 mailer. An example Promela model of a system of 3
Client processes and a Mailer process in which Client[0] has encryption, Client[1] filters
messages from Client[2] and property 4 is to be verified for i = 0, j = 2 can be found on
our website at [5].
For all verification runs we used a PC with a 2.4GHZ Intel Xenon processor, 3GB of
available main memory, running Linux (2.4.18).
An overview of the reasoning process is given in Figure 4.
4.1 Use of Perl Scripts
For each pair of features, set of feature parameters, associated property and set of prop-
erty parameters, a relevant model needs to be individually constructed, to ensure that only
relevant variables are included and set. We have developed two Perl scripts, mailchange.pl
and auto mailchange.pl for automatically configuring the model and for generating model-
checking runs. These scripts greatly reduce the time to prepare each model and the scope for
errors.
During initial investigations, mailchange.pl is used to generate a model for a given set of
features, feature parameters, property and property parameters. The resulting model is then
loaded into SPIN with an appropriate set of search parameters (MSD, POR, WF for example)
and results interpreted manually. Once confidence has been gained in the model, suitable
values assertained for the value of MSD and the applicability of POR and WF determined
for successful verification in each case, auto mailchange.pl is used to iteratively select pairs
of features and parameters, set up model checking runs and interpret results. An overnight
run is required to collect all results from all pairs of features and suitable parameter sets. It is
important to note that a certain amount of simple symmetry reduction is incorporated within
the Perl script to avoid repeating runs of configurations which are identical up to renaming of
processes.
Figure 4: The reasoning set up
Table 1: Results of verification of the properties
Feature Prop WF? POR? MSD States Depth Mem Time
(104) (104) (Mb) (s)
basic 1 
p
6 8:3 52989 4:4 2
basic 2 
p
0:01 0:001 85 2:3 0:1
basic 3
p
 17 98:2 162286 38:2 44
encryption 4 
p
13 9:3 121792 4:8 3
decryption 5 
p
5 10:2 45365 4:2 3
filtering 6 
p
6 7:1 52069 3:7 2
forwarding 7 
p
0:01 0:001 66 2:3 0:1
autorespond 8
p p
17 250 163176 111:5 334
The interpretation stage of auto mailchange.pl involves reading the output file from the
SPIN verification run. Firstly it is checked that the maximum search depth (MSD) has not
been reached and that the total memory available has not been exhausted. If neither of these
is true, the second phase of the interpretation phase involves checking if there are any errors -
and as such, whether the associated property is true. Finally, the interpretation stage involves
determining whether a feature interaction has occurred and, if so, what type (SU or MU). All
parameter sets and corresponding results are output to a results file.
4.2 Results - single property validation
Table 1 gives the results of verification of properties 1 – 8. In each case the feature (if any) as-
sociated with the property is given in the column labelled ‘feature’. When there is no feature
present, (during the verification of properties 1–3) the term ‘basic’ is written in this column.
When a feature is present, the verification corresponds to checking the associated property
for a model consisting of a Mailer process, two basic Client processes and a Client processes
for which the given feature is ‘turned on’. (When no feature is present the associated model
simply consists of a Mailer process and three Client processes.) In all cases we give re-
sults for verification of the model in which Client[0] has the given feature (in relation to
Client[1] if appropriate) and i (and j) is (are) assigned the value(s) 0 (and 1). The Prop col-
umn contains the property being checked and a
p
or a  in the ‘WF?’ and ‘POR?’ columns
indicate whether weak-fairness and partial order reduction are selected respectively. Note that
property 3 is the only property for which POR is not applied. This is due to the presence of
the next operator (X) in the property. Also, WF is only applied during the verification of
liveness properties – properties that contain the eventually operator <>. The entries in the
MSD column show the value to which the maximum search depth is set prior to verification.
The remaining columns contain the number of stored states, the depth reached, the memory
required for state storage (in Mbyte) and the time taken (in seconds) for each verification.
4.3 Results - feature interactions
Now we turn our attention to consideration of pairs of features. For each pair of features we
generate a model for each distinct set of parameters (the union of the sets of parameters for
each feature) and for each appropriate set of property parameters. This may mean that up
to 5 client processes are required. For example, if Client[i] has filtering from Client[j] and
Client[k] has filtering from Client[l], (i, j, k, l distinct), then 4 client processes are required.
For each suitable pair of features, f
i
, f
j
, an interaction is said to occur if the feature property
associated with f
i
does not hold for the model in which features are f
i
and f
j
are present.
Note that we do not consider the basic service in our analysis, as all other features interact
with it in some way. This can be determined without the need for model-checking.
We enumerate the interactions found below. In each case, we indicate whether the interac-
tion is single user (SU), i.e. both features reside at the same network component, or multiple
user (MU), i.e. the features reside at different network components. We also give a witness
for the interaction. We do not give details of timing or memory requirements etc. as these
vary depending on the parameter set under consideration. (There are 111 feasible parameter
sets after symmetry reduction. It would be impractical to give details of such requirements
for each case.) In some cases more Client processes are required to fully check for interac-
tion. Clearly when more Clients are required, verification takes longer and more memory is
required. In addition, when an error is reported during verification (in most cases, excluding
the verification of property 2, indicating an interaction) a full search of the state-space is not
required. This again results in far smaller time and memory requirements.
1. encryption and decryption (SU)
witness i=j=0 – Client[i] has encryption and decryption
2. encryption and decryption (MU)
witness i=0, j=1 – Client[i] has encryption, Client[j] has decryption
3. filter and forward (MU)
witness i = 0; j = 1 – Client[i] has filter from j, Client[j] has forwarding to i
4. forward and forward (MU)
witness i=0,j=1,k=2 – Client[i] has forwarding to j, Client[j] has forwarding to i
5. autoresponse and filter (SU)
witness i = 0; j = 1 –Client[i] has autoresponse, Client[i] has filter from j
6. autoresponse and filter (MU)
witness i=0,j=1 – Client[i] has autoresponse, Client[j] has filter from i
7. autoresponse and forward (SU)
witness i = 0; j = 2 – Client[i] has autoresponse, Client[i] has forwarding to j
8. autoresponse and forward (MU)
witness i = 0; j = 1 – Client[i] has autoresponse, Client[j] has forwarding to i
Each of these pairs of features are listed in Hall’s results [12] but in all cases, he only reports a
MU example. While Hall explicitly states that his method is not complete, it is not clear if the
SU interactions would be found in his approach, or he stopped after the MU interaction was
found. Our method is combinatorially complete. We note that in the MU cases, our witnesses
are identical to Hall’s (modulo translation).
5 Generalisation
We have shown above that a property holds (or does not hold) for a fixed number of clients,
i.e. for
Client[0]jjClient[1]jj : : : Client[m]jjMailer, where jj denotes parallel composition. But how
can we deduce that (if at all) a property holds for
Client[0]jjClient[1]jj : : : jjClient[n]jjMailer, for an arbitrary n? It is not possible to demon-
strate this with straight-forward model-checking [1].
More formally, the generalisation problem is how to prove (disprove)
M(Client[0]jjClient[1]jj : : : jjClient[n]jjMailer) j= [0; 1; : : : ; t]
where the left hand side is the finite-state model of the parallel composition of client and
mailer processes (the former are instances of the parameterised process Client) and [0; 1; : : : ; t]
is a temporal logic formula containing free variables indexed by 0; 1; : : : ; t. The indices refer
to instances of Client (e.g. the variables i and j in section 3.4). In general, the Client[i] are
not isomorphic because they have different sets of features enabled.
We offer a solution based on abstraction and model-checking. The technique and theoret-
ical justification are described in more detail in [8, 7], here we apply the results. Briefly, the
technique involves choosing a fixed m, such that t is constrained by 0  t  m  1. We refer
toClient[0]jj : : : jjClient[m 1] as concrete processes and theClient[m]jj : : : jjClient[n 1]
as abstract processes. We represent the behaviour ofClient[m]jj : : : jjClient[n 1], by a new
abstract process, Abstractclient. We do not assume that the (original) abstract processes, i.e.
Client[m]jj : : : jjClient[n   1] are isomorphic: they might have different combinations of
features enabled. However, we do assume that the features are all drawn from our given set
and we know how they can communicate with each other and more importantly, how they
communicate with the concrete processes.
A model of the m concrete processes, together with the abstract process, is generated
automatically from a model of the concrete processes together with a single (parameterised)
Client. This is summarised by Figure 5. The value of m depends upon the particular feature
set considered. Here, because each feature involves at most two parameters, a worst case anal-
ysis suggests that 5 concrete Clients are required, however further detailed analysis shows
that in this case, we require only a maximum of 4. For some combinations, 3 will suffice.
Our approach is based upon our result:
M(Client[0]jjClient[1]jj : : : Client[m]jjAbstractclientjjMailer
0
) j= [0; 1; : : : ; t]
)
M(Client[0]jjClient[1]jj : : : Client[n]jjMailer) j= [0; 1; : : : ; t].
The process Mailer0 is a slightly modified version of Mailer, modified to take into account
communication with Abstractclient (instead of communication with the original abstract pro-
cesses).
Thus to generalise interaction analysis results, we need only consider interaction analysis
of the finite (model of) Client[0]jjClient[1]jj : : : Client[m]jjAbstractclientjjMailer0:
In the next section we outline the form of Abstractclient and Mailer0 and give our
interaction analysis results.
Client Client
concrete processes
0 1 Clientm-1
Abstractclient
Client
m
... Client
n
represented by
abstract process
Mailer
Figure 5: Generalised Email service
5.1 Abstractclient specification and analysis results
Abstractclient is defined as follows. Abstractclient can only affect the behaviour of the
m concrete processes indirectly via Mailer0. Therefore, communication to/from a concrete
process from/to Mailer0 takes place via a virtual channel. Rather than concrete processes
reading/writing to this (virtual) channel and behaving accordingly, each possible read is re-
placed by a non-deterministic choice over the possible contents of the channel. In this way,
all possible behaviours are explored (a write to the virtual channel is not relevant).
As an example, when m = 3 Abstractclient is as follows:
proctype Abstractclient(byte id)
{Mail msg;
atomic
{
msg.receiver=M;
msg.sender=M;
msg.key=M;
msg.body=0};
do
::blocked==1->blocked=0
::atomic{nfull(network)->
if
::msg.receiver=0
::msg.receiver=1
::msg.receiver=2
::msg.receiver=3
/*another client within Abs process */
fi;
msg.sender=id;
network!msg;
msg.receiver=M;
msg.sender=M}
od
}
Note that the Abstractclient process can send messages to Mailer0 (via the network
channel), but does not receive messages. Abstractclient is also able to set the blocked vari-
able to 0. This simulates “unblocking” Mailer0 when it is unable to “send” a message to
a particular process within the abstract process. Note that Abstractclient is always able to
unblock Mailer0 but can only send messages when the network channel is not full. This re-
flects the finite model. When Mailer0 wants to “deliver” a message to Abstractclient, it first
checks whether the relevant channel is blocked (via non-deterministic choice). If so,Mailer0
waits until the channel becomes unblocked (when the blocked variable is reset to 0 by Ab-
stractclient) before delivering the message. (In fact no message is actually sent, but Mailer0
continues as if it has been.) Here we give the Mailer0 proctype:
proctype Mailer’()
{
Mail msg;
chan deliverbox=null;
atomic{
bit myanswer=0;
msg.sender = M;
msg.receiver= M;
msg.key=M;
msg.body=0;
}
loop:
atomic{
network?msg;
filter_message(msg.receiver,msg.sender,myanswer);
if
:: myanswer -> /* throw away message from this sender*/
myanswer=0;
msg.sender = M;
msg.receiver= M;
msg.body = 0; msg.key = M;
deliverbox = null;goto loop
:: else -> skip
fi;
if
::msg.receiver==3->/* abstract process */
if
:: blocked=0
:: blocked=1
fi
::else->
mailbox_lookup(msg.receiver,deliverbox)
fi;
/* now pass on message */
}
atomic{
if
::((msg.receiver!=3)&&(nfull(deliverbox)))->deliverbox!msg
::((msg.receiver==3)&&(blocked==0))->skip /*delivered virtual message*/
fi;
/*reset variables to initial values*/
msg.sender = M; msg.receiver= M; msg.body = 0; msg.key = M;
deliverbox = null;
goto loop
}}
The concrete Client processes are declared in the usual way and communication between
them and Mailer is unchanged.
It is important to note that this model is not, strictly, a conservative extension, because
Abstractclient allows additional behaviour. Namely, an (abstract) client can send mail even
when there is mail to be delivered (to that client). This is not possible in any concrete model.
However, the constraint that mail delivery takes priority is in the concrete model only to
prevent deadlock (when mail buffers are full), not for any reason of functional behaviour.
Relaxing this constraint in the general model neither allows deadlock nor affects the obser-
vational behaviour of the system. Thus the constraint is safely relaxed and our approach is
sound.
The interaction analysis results reveal no new interactions, nor new witnesses. We there-
fore do not give details, save to indicate that time and space complexity lie in between those
for the system with m (concrete) Clients and m+ 1 (concrete) Clients. The value of m de-
pends on the parameter set and the property to be verified. Again, all analysis was automated
through the use of Perl scripts.
An (abridged) example Promela model of a system ofm = 3Client processes, a Mailer’
process and an Abstractclient process in which Client[0] has encryption, Client[1] filters
messages from Client[2] and property 4 is to be verified for i = 0, j = 2 can be found in the
appendix below. The full model can be found on our website at [5].
6 Conclusions
We have developed a property-based approach to feature interaction analysis for a client-
server email system. The feature set described here is not as extensive as Hall’s [12], but it is
sufficient to reveal most of the interesting behaviour (from a modelling point of view) and to
validate our approach. On the other hand, our analysis is complete and fully automated. We
note that a difficult feature for our implementation was autoresponder, this is because unlike
most other features, it initiated the sending of a completely new message. This was a diffi-
culty because we chose to use asynchronous communication, with fixed size communication
channels (thus leading to more interleavings and potentially, more interactions).
Additionally, our results are scalable, that is they generalise to email systems consisting
of any number of Client processes.
Abstraction techniques are used to prove the general results. The key idea is to model-
check a system consisting of a constant number (m) of client processes, in parallel with an
“abstract” process which represents the product of any number of other client processes. We
give a lower bound for the value of m, for our given feature set.
While the general results did not reveal any new interactions (and we admit it is difficult
to think of situations where they would, for fixed feature sets), it is nevertheless important to
prove rigorously that results scale up. We have achieved this.
Our results demonstrate the feasibility of the abstraction technique for this application
domain – the model-checking requirements are well within the capability of our machine.
Also, the transformation to a general model is relatively straightforward: we need only con-
sider the communication between the abstract process and the concrete process(es). (In this
case, we need only consider communication with Mailer process, as there is no peer-peer
communication.) An alternative, an induction approach [9, 15], requires the construction of
an inductive invariant. This involves incorporating the behaviour of the entire system within
the invariant; moreover, it requires that both the concrete and abstract m Clients are isomor-
phic. Our abstraction approach offers a more suitable and tractable alternative. However, at
some level they are similar, future work aims to establish this.
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Appendix: The email service with features
The following model is an abridged version of one generated (by a Perl script from template)
for features: encryption[0] and filter[1]=2 to verify property 4 with i=0 and j=2. Note that
‘etc.’ indicates that some lines of code have been omitted, for space reasons. The full model
(including the appropriate never-claim and bit vector definitions) can be found on our website
at [5].
Example Promela model
typedef Mail
{byte sender;byte receiver;byte key;bit body};
/*need bit vector definitions in here*/
#define k 1 /*size of Mailbox */
#define N 2 /* size of network channel */
#define M 4 /*default value of variables */
bit blocked=0;
chan null=[k] of {Mail};
chan zero=[k] of {Mail};
(etc.)
chan network = [N] of {Mail};
BITV_8 Encrypt=0; byte Filter[M]=M;
byte last_del_to2_from=M;
bit last_del_to2_body=0;
inline mailbox_lookup(login,box)
{
if
:: (login==0) -> box = zero
(etc.)
fi}
inline encrypt_message(login,answer)
{if
::(IS_1(Encrypt,login))->answer=1
::else->answer=0
fi
/*if encryption is on, answer=1,
otherwise answer=0*/}
inline filt_mess(to,from,answer)
{if
::(Filter[to]==from)->answer=1
::else->answer=0
fi
/*if appropriate filter is on, answer=1,
otherwise answer=0*/
}
inline reset_vars(i)
{(etc.)}
inline set_deliv_vars(i,from,to)
{(etc.)}
inline set_body(i,text)
{if
::i==2->last_del_to2_body=text
::else->skip
fi}
proctype Client(byte id)
{chan mybox=null; Mail msg;
atomic{msg.sender=M; msg.receiver=M;
msg.key=M; msg.body=0;bool myanswer=0;
/*get appropriate mailbox*/
mailbox_lookup(id,mybox)};
initial:atomic{
(nempty(mybox)||nfull(network));
/* wait here if cannot send or deliver */
reset_vars(id);
if
:: nempty(mybox) -> goto delivermail
:: empty(mybox)&&nfull(network)->goto sendmail
fi;
delivermail:
mybox?msg; set_body(id,msg.body);
set_deliv_vars(id,msg.sender,msg.receiver);
goto endClient;
sendmail:/*specify recipient */
if
:: msg.receiver= 0
(etc.)
fi;
encrypt_message(id,myanswer);
if
:: myanswer -> /*encryption on */
myanswer=0;
/* use reciever id as key */
msg.body = 1; msg.key = msg.receiver
:: else -> msg.body = 0; /*no encryp*/
fi;
msg.sender = id; /* specify sender */
network!msg; /* send mail */
endClient:
/* reset other variables */
msg.sender = M; (etc.) goto initial}}
proctype Network_Mailer()
{
Mail msg; chan deliverbox=null;
atomic{
bit myanswer=0; (etc.)}
loop:
atomic{network?msg;
filt_mess(msg.receiver,msg.sender,myanswer);
if
:: myanswer ->/* throw away message*/
myanswer=0;msg.sender = M;
msg.receiver= M;(etc.)
deliverbox = null;goto loop
:: else -> skip
fi;
if
::msg.receiver==3->
if
:: blocked=0
:: blocked=1
fi
::else->
mailbox_lookup(msg.receiver,deliverbox)
fi;
/* now pass on message */
}
atomic{
if
::((msg.receiver!=3)&&(nfull(deliverbox)))->
deliverbox!msg
::((msg.receiver==3)&&(blocked==0))->skip
/*delivered virtual message*/
fi;
/*reset variables to initial values*/
msg.sender = M; (etc.)
deliverbox = null; goto loop}};
proctype Abstractclient(byte id)
{Mail msg;
atomic
{msg.receiver=M;
msg.sender=M; msg.key=M; msg.body=0};
do
::blocked==1->blocked=0
::atomic{nfull(network)->
if
::msg.receiver=0
(etc.)
::msg.receiver=3 /*other client in Abs proc */
fi;
msg.sender=id;network!msg;
msg.receiver=M;msg.sender=M}
od}
init
{atomic{SET_1(Encrypt,0);Filter[1]=2;
run Abstract(3);run Network_Mailer();
run Client(0); run Client(1);run Client(2);}}
